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ETHICS AND THE STRUGGLE FOR LIFE.
This world of ours is a world of strife. Wherever
we turn our eyes, there is war and competition and
struggle. Battles are fought not only in human so-
ciety, but in animal society also ; not only in the ani-
mal kingdom, but in the plant kingdom ; not onl)' in
the empire of organized life, but in the realm of inor-
ganic life—between the ocean and the land, between
water and air, among minerals, and among the dif-
ferent formations of mineral bodies, among planets
and planetar)' systems, among suns and clusters of
suns. Strife is identical with life, and struggle is the
normal state of actual existence.
We can easily understand that a superficial ob-
server of nature will feel inclined to look upon life as
a chaotic jungle without rhyme or reason, in which
the wildest hap-hazard and fortuitous chance rule su-
preme. A closer inspection, however, will show that
there is after all order in the general turmoil and that a
wonderful harmon}' results from the conflict of antag-
onistic principles. Nay, we shall learn that all order
proceeds from the antagonism of factors that work in
opposite directions. It is the centrifugal and centrip-
etal forces that shape our earth and keep it in equilib-
rium. It is attraction and repulsion that govern the
changes of chemistry. Gravitation throws all things
into one centre, and radiation disperses the store of
energy collected in that centre. And the same antith-
esis of hostile principles manifests itself in love and
hate, in surfeit and hunger, in hope and fear.
There are many people who are not satisfied with
this state of things. They dream of a paradise where
there is no strife, no war, no conflict ; where there is
eternal peace, unmixed happiness, joy without pain,
and life without struggle. Whenever you try to de-
pict in your imagination such a condition of things,
}'ou will find that a world of eternal peace is an im-
possibility. The world in which life does not signify
a constant struggle is not a heaven of perfection (as
is imagined), but the cloudland of Utopia, an impos-
sible state of fantastical contradictions. Should you
succeed in realizing in imagination the dream of your
ideal of peace without inconsistency, it will turn out
to be the Nirvana of absolute non-existence, the
silence of the grave, the eternal rest of death.
Natural science teaches that hate is inversed love
and repulsion inversed attraction. Annihilate one
principle and the other vanishes. Both principles are
one and the same in opposite directions. Thus they
come into conflict and their conflict is the process of life.
Science does away with all dualism. The dualistic view
appears natural to a crude and child-like mind. The
Indian might say that heat is not cold and cold is
not heat, yet the man who learns to express tempera-
ture by the exact measurement of a thermometer must
abandon the duality of the two principles. Monism is
established as soon as science commences to weigh
and to measure. The divergence in the oneness of
existence creates the two opposed principles, which
are the factors that shape the world, and the en-
counter of conflicting factors is the basis from which
all life arises with its pains and joys, its affliction and
happiness, with its battles, defeats, and victories.
The world being a world of struggle, life teaches
us the lesson that we live in order to fight ; we must
not blink at this truth, for we cannot shirk the com-
bat. Ethics, accordingly, if it is true ethics, and prac-
tical ethics, must above all be an ethics of strife. It
must teach us how to struggle, how to fight, how to
aspire. In order to teach us the /low, it must show us
the goal that is to be striven for, and the ideal which
we should pursue.
The progress of civilization changes the weapons
and abolishes barbaric practices
;
yet it will never
abolish the struggle itself. The struggle will become
more humane, it will be fought without the unneces-
sary waste which accompanies the rude warfare of the
savage, but even a golden era of peace and social
order will continue to remain an unceasing strife and
competition. You cannot abolish competition even
in the most complete co-operative system. There
will always remain the struggle for occupying this or
that place, and the competition for proving to be the
fittest will continue so long as the world lasts ; and
it is the plan of nature to let the fittest survive.
There are ethical teachers who imagine that the
purpose of ethics is the suppression of all struggle,
who depict a state of society where there is pure
altruism without conflicting interests, a state of mutual
love, a heaven of undisturbed happiness.
The ethics of pure altruism is just as wrong as the
ethics of pure egotism. For it is our duty to stand
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up manfully in battle and to wage the war of honest
aspirations. It is the duty of a manufacturer to com-
pete with his competitors. It is the duty of the
scholar, the philosopher, and the artist to rival the
work of his co-laborers ; and the progress of humanity
is the result of this general warfare. Organized life
from its lowliest beginnings developed higher and
higher by a continued struggle ; and it is not the
victor alone to whom the evolution of ever higher and
higher organisms is due, but to the vanquished also.
The victor has gained new virtues in every strife, and
it is the brave resistance of the vanquished that taught
him these virtues.
There is an old saga of a northern hero, to whose
soul, it is said, were added all the souls of the enemies
he slew. The strength, the accompHshments, the
abilities of the conquered became the spoils of the
conqueror ; and the spirits of the slain continued to
live in the spirit of the victor, and made him stronger,
nobler, wiser, better. This myth correctly represents
the natural state of things, and we learn from it the
great truth, that our efforts, even if we are the unfor-
tunate party that is to be vanquished, will not be in
vain ; our lives are not spent in uselessness, if we but
struggle bravely and do the best we can in the battle
of life. Furthermore, we learn to respect our adver-
saries and to honor their courage. We are one factor
only on the battlefield, and if our enemies existed not,
we would not be what we are. We are one part only
of the process of life and our enemies are the counter-
part. Any contumely that we put upon them in fool-
ish narrow-mindedness, debases and degrades our-
selves ; any dishonesty that we show in fight, falls
back upon ourselves. It will injure our enemies, as
was intended, but it will do greater harm to ourselves,
for it will disgrace us ; and our disgrace in that case
will outlive the injury of our enemies.
Ethics teaches us that all struggle must be under-
taken in the service of a higher and greater cause than
our egoistic self. He alone will conquer who fights for
something greater than his personal interests ; and
even if he be vanquished, he will still have the satis-
faction that his ideal is not conquered with him. He
will find successors to continue his work. His ideal,
if it be a genuine ideal, will rise again in his succes-
sors and they will accomplish a final victory for his
aspirations.
The Teutonic nations,— the Anglo-Saxons, the
Franks, the Germans and their kin,—are, it appears, in
many respects the most successful peoples in the world,
because of their stern ethics of undaunted struggle to
which they have adhered since prehistoric times. It
was no disgrace for the Teutonic warrior to be slain, no
dishonor to be vanquished ; but it was infamy worse
than death to be a coward, it was a disgrace to gain
a victory by dishonest means. The enemy was re-
lentlessly combated, may be he was hated, yet it would
have been a blot on one's escutcheon to treat him with
meanness. It was not uncommon among these bar-
barians for the victor to place a laurel wreath upon
the grave of his foe, whom in life he had combated
with bitterest hatred. There is an episode told in the
Nibeiungensaga which characterizes the ethical spirit
of the combativeness of Teutonic heroes. Markgrave
Riidiger has to meet the g»im Hagen and to do him
battle. Seeing, however, that his enemy's shield is
hacked to pieces, he offers him his own, whereupon
they proceed to fight.
The moral teacher must not be blind to the laws of
life. Ethics must not make us weak in the struggle
for existence, but it must teach us the way to fight and
must show us the higher purpose to be realized by
our struggle.
Naturalists give us most remarkable reports about
the degeneration of those organs and their functions
and abilities which are not used. If man could live
without reason, without education, language, without
reason, mankind would soon degenerate into dumb
brutes.
T)o not attempt to preach a morality that would de-
prive man of his backbone. Man acquired his back-
bone because in the struggle for life he had to stand
upright, thus to keep his own. If it were possible
at all to lead a life without struggle, the backbone of
man would soon become a rudimentary organ. But
as it is not possible, those men alone will survive that
are strong characters, that stand upright in the strug-
gle and fight with manly honesty and noble courage.
The men with a moral backbone alone are those to
whom the future belongs.
Ethics must teach us how to struggle ; it must not
hinder us in the combat but help us. And ethics will
help us. Ethics demands that we shall never lose
sight of the whole to which we belong. It teaches us
never to forget the aim which humanity attains through
the efforts of our conflicting interests ; it inculcates the
lesson to do our duty in the battle of life, not only be-
cause this is required by our own interests, but be-
cause it is the law of life that we have to obey. By a
faithful obedience to the ethics of the struggle for life,
we shall promote the welfare of mankind and contrib-
ute to the enhancement of human progress.
FROM MY ROMAN NOTE-BOOK.
BY MONCURE D. CONWAY.
I.
Through a valued friend, a French priest, well ac-
quainted with my heresies, I received an invitation to
"assist" at the Consistory in the Vatican, December
30, 1889. The only conditions imposed were that my
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ladies should appear in black, with veils for bonnets,
and I in evening dress, with white cravat. I did not
attend in any antagonistic spirit. On my way to the
Vatican I almost wondered that no "survival" of the
horror of "Romanism," in which I was nurtured, gave
any stir within me. But my cab happening to be
blocked in front of Hadrian's castellated mausoleum,
I gazed on the great bronze archangel above it, sheath-
ing his sword after the plague he was supposed to
have caused, and found in it a symbol of the sheathed
sword of papal dominion. The temporal power is for-
ever sheathed, however compulsory the scabbard.
When the battle is over the victors may fairly indulge
themselves in magnanimity. Those who fear that the
sword may be unsheathed again, may keep their weap-
ons. Having no such fear I throw mine away. To-day,
I said, bygones shall be bygones. To-day, freedom is
even less liable to be harmed by Catholicism than by
Protestantism ; and apart from political freedom, where
is the advantage ? Why should I prefer Jehovah to
Mary, or the bottomless Pit to Purgatory?
However, I was presently reminded that it was not
to a manifestation of the religious side of Catholicism
that I had come, but to a momentary "materializa-
tion," as the spirits say, of the defunct Temporal
Power. My sympathetic sentiments were indeed some-
what chilled as I entered by the "royal stair" into
that "Royal Hall," between files of soldiers, armed
with muskets, pikes, and swords. But I presently re-
covered equanimity on observing that all the weapons
were antiquarian, and the uniforms antiquarian. They
did not "mean business." It was a sort of masque-
rade. Nay, was I not myself in full evening dress, at
ten in the morning, as if just from a ball? So I exam-
ined the upheld swords. Some were two yards long,
or more. They had quaint hilts, crosswise, jeweled,
and among the curious was a crooked one that seemed
to represent the Sword of Flame. No doubt each has
its history, and may have symbolized the submission of
some proud prince. The pikes had crooked axes a
half yard from the point, and were upheld by men in
striped raiment, something like the "beefeaters" who
make picturesque exhibitions at the Tower of London.
The "Swiss Guards" are on hand, but very meek as
contrasted with their old days—which I can remem-
ber—when they were prompt to handle roughly any
poor pious wight who might be kneeling in the path of a
pontifical procession. There was a gallery for the ambas-
sadors commissioned to the Pope,—Spanish, French,
Spanish. But they were all behind Sir John Simmons,
the only protestant representative. He is here because
England has Catholic dependencies,—Ireland and
French Canada,—but his office has yet to be passed on
by the Commons, and he has no establishment; he
boards at a hotel. The real Ambassador, to the king,
is on the floor with the rest of us, in evening dress,
his wife and daughter being in one of the two tiers of
ladies in black—who appear as if at a funeral. On
looking and listening around me I perceive that the
majority of the guests are English and American tour-
ists, no doubt mainly protestants. We are in the place
of the princes once received in this "Royal Hall" by
the mighty Pontiff.
We stood patiently for nearly an hour. Then the
papal procession began to enter. The choristers in
scarlet and white filed into their places. Then there
were Cardinals in ermine and scarlet, with long pur-
ple trains borne by pages, and red satin skull-caps
;
then Bishops in purple and lace. Finally two mighty
fans of white feathers floating at the top of velvet-cov-
ered poles are visible ; between them is the throne,
borne aloft on the shoulders of men, and on it seated
Leon XIII, the white old man whom the Catholic -world
calls Holy Father.
The first thing that impressed me was the pathos
of it all. This thin man of eighty years, whose life is
prolonged only by constant precautions, appeared so
lonely up there in the air ! Him no tender arm of wife
or daughter awaits, when, exhausted and ill, he re-
turns to his solitude. He waves his benediction on
the company beneath him with hands half covered
with white mittens, and light flashes down from his
huge seal ring, set round with large diamonds. This
is the ring of his wedlock,—wedlock of the Church as
Bride, and the heavenly Bridegroom. Our very even-
ing dresses and white cravats are now supposed to be
sanctified. Some pious ladies are said to have carried
many rosaries, to be afterwards presented to their
friends as having been blest by the Pope.
The Cardinals and Bishops have taken their places
in the reserved enclosure, and bend low as the Pope
is borne past them. He is let down gently, and sup-
ported to a larger throne. Then thej' all take their
seats, like the lords spiritual and temporal in the
British House of Lords, and the choir breaks out
with a triumphant anthem. Meanwhile the Pontiff
sits still, and with his brilliant robes, and his triple
crown, reminds me of certain Hindu deities that I
have seen in their temples. The music ended, the
work of the day proceeds. Three Cardinals are to be
created—all from the "secular clergy"—that is, be-
longing to no Order. One of these is Monsignor
Richard, Archbishop of Paris ; another is Monsignor
Foullon, Archbishop of Lyons ; the third is the Aus-
trian, once eminent as General Shoenborn. This
third one alone is a striking figure,—a tall, handsome,
Bismark like personage. His air is military, and one
cannot help wondering that such a man should be-
come a Cardinal. He was engaged in the mortal
struggle at Sadowa, and was one of the only two offi-
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cers of his regiment who survived. Then he became
a priest, and ultimately Archbishop of Prague.
The Secretary reads some official document ; a
Cardinal recites a prayer ; the Te Deum is sung. The
Pope's shoe is removed. The new Cardinal ap-
proaches, and is presented by the Pope's hand with a
brimless crown-shaped hat of bright red satin. This
is held by an attendant over its possessor's head as he
bends to kiss the Pope's foot, then rises to kiss the
Pope's hand. The Pope then embraces the new Car-
dinal, kissing him on both cheeks. This being thrice
repeated the ceremonies of the Royal Hall are over.
With some evidence of feebleness the Pope reaches
the throne on which he entered, and is borne out as
he came, again waving benedictions on. us with uncon-
sciously graceful movements of his hand. I had a
better opportunity of observing his face. He has a
large' aquiline nose, curving over a sweet but melan-
choly mouth ; his chin is weak, his eyes are blue and
frank; his brow is not strong, but there is a scholarly
look about him, as if he read much.
As the Pope floated out I remarked on the back of
his aerial throne the papal arms, richly wrought, and a
sun with rays worked in gold and silver. This re-
called the well-known incident which occurred at
the close of the Convention in Philadelphia, in
1787, which framed our Constitution. As Washing-
ton was leaving the chair in which he had presided
over the Convention, Franklin approached and pointed
to the image of the sun carved on its back. He said
that at various junctures of the debates he had won-
dered whether it were a rising or a setting sun. " But
now," he added, "I feel certain that it is a rising
sun."
It is a terrible ordeal these prelates have to endure
in marching beneath critical eyes, without the shield
of any beard or of any hat. Every line of the shaven
face comes out ; the thick lip, the sensual touch, the
double chin, the bovine neck, the corvine nose, are
visible here and there, contrasted with other faces
with touches of beauty and spirituality. But I must
admit that the Cardinals as a body did not impress me
so favorably as the Bishops. Perhaps it was that
every expression of humility is lost under the loud-
ness of such raiment.
After conducting the Pope to his apartments the
prelates and cardinals and choir returned, moved
through the Royal Hall, and we followed them into
the Sistine Chapel. There was a brief service, which
included some grand singing,—for a good voice is
essential for a prelate. I found myself standing im-
mediately beneath Michael Angelo's great ceiling pic-
tures,—Eve received by the Almighty as she emerges
from Adam's side ; Eve and Adam receiving the apple
offered by the serpent, which has the face and breast
of a beautiful woman (Lilith) ; Eve and Adam driven
out of Paradise. The service was carried on at an
altar on the wall otherwise completely covered by the
greatest mural painting in the world—Michael An-
gelo's Last Judgment. In the lower corner is pic-
tured a Cardinal, girdled by a serpent,—this being the
artist's punishment of the prurient prudery which
wished to drape his pictures. The figure of Jesus as
a ferocious judge, his mother trying to restrain his
fury, is there witnessing the tremendous terrors which
led to the worship of Mary. I do not wonder that
Hawthorne was scandalized by this representation.
" I fear I am myself among the wicked, " he wrote,
"for I found myself inevitably taking their part, and
asking for at least a little pity." In other words^
Hawthorne did exactly what Mary is doing in the pic-
ture ; he touches, without realizing it, the secret of
Mariolatry. He complains that Jesus should "ever
be represented in that aspect," forgetting that it is the
scriptural aspect. The fact is that when the Puritans
destroyed the idea of the maternal divinity, they ren-
dered inevitable a feminine evolution of Jesus. Haw-
thorne's Jesus is really a Madonna.
While I am gazing on the_ grand picture, to which
the choir makes a sort of antiphon, the service ends.-
The three new Cardinals take their stand, in the
order of age, at the hither end of a reserved space,
and each is greeted with kisses by all the rest. The
hand is grasped, and the kiss is on both cheeks.
Then they disappear from the public, and are received
in secret consistory. Here the papal Allocution is
read in Latin. There is also the ceremony, which must
be curious, of shutting up the Cardinals. The Pope
with his fingers closes the mouths of the new cardi-
nals to indicate that as Cardinals, they are not to talk.
As priests (if such they are, for laymen may be Cardi-
nals) they may speak, but nothing that they say is in
any case to carry authority or weight as coming from
a Cardinal. The kissing of the Pope's foot and hand
is thus not an idle ceremony ; his Cardinals are to be
as his silent bodily members obeying the papal brain.
Leaving the Vatican, I find myself recurring to
the gold-and-silver Sun on the throne, and asking
Franklin's question—Is it a rising or a setting sun ?
So far as the Temporal Supremacy is concerned, it is
long after Sunset ; what we have seen is Afterglow.
The Allocution by its very complainings reveals the
growing sense of hopelessness. Clearly nothing has
been gained to the Church by its irreconcilable atti-
tude towards the State, but something has been lost.
The government having found abuses in the admin-
istration of charitable foundations,—abuses of a kind
that invariably grow around endowments from the
Past,—have had to take them in hand, and we adapt
them, in harmony with changed circumstances. This
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was done in England not many years ago, where it
was found that money, bequeathed to the poor in
parishes where no poor remain, was enjoyed by the
rich. The English Church resisted change, but, when
overborne, joined in carrying it out. But now that the
Pope has denounced the new law, it is difficult to see
how the Church can have any share in the future
distribution of these important charities. It wDuld
appear imprudent to transfer entirely to the secular
hand the credit for alms and bounties hitherto associ-
ated by the people with their pastors. If this suicidal
policy continue the future of the Church in Italy may
be seriously affected. But probably it will not con-
tinue. When the present Pope dies—and the hour
cannot be distant—there will be a crisis. The Church
will have to decide whether its irreconcilable attitude,
and a claim of martyrdom that has become stale, are
worth what they are costing. It may see in England,
in Germany, what good things state churches possess
when they consent to temporal subordination, and
what vast services they may render to the poor. Much
will depend on the next Pope, and perhaps more on
these dumb Cardinals.
AGNOSTICISM VS. GNOSTICISM.
BY PAUL R. SHIPMAN. '
LCONCLUDED.]
This conclusion * gathers force from a further
scrutiny of the language that involves it. In the
philosophy of Kant, from which the Editor avowedly
has drawn the staple of his own philosophy, the phra-
ses " existence in general " and " things in general "
mean respectivel}', as indeed their words import,
existence in itself and ' things in themselves ; they
refer not to phenomena, but to noumena. And yet the
Editor, who doubtless knows his Kant by heart, de-
clares in the citation just made that "existence in
general," though not subject to the law of causation,
" must be accepted as a fact "; in other words, he de-
clares in effect that the unknowable is unquestionable.
And, again "The question itself, as to the cause
of existence in general," these are his words, still
lingering in the reader's mind, "is not admissible, for
the law of causation is applicable to all phenomena of
nature, but not to the existence of nature, which must be
accepted as a fact." Very well, say we all : but, as the
phenomenaof nature constitute the manifestation of ex-
istence in general, and as the manifestation is under the
law of causation and existence in general is above it,
existence and its manifestation, contrary to his doctrine,
are not one thing, but inevitably two things ; of which
existence, as free from causation and absolute in cer-
tainty, does not admit of being either grasped or
* Referring to the preceding sentence, which alleges that the case against
agnosticism is surrendered.
doubted. If existence in general and its manifestation
were one, the law of causation obviously would be
applicable to the former as well as to the latter ; and,
hence, in declaring that it is not applicable to exist-
ence in general, which notwithstanding must be ac-
cepted as a fact, he confesses—nay, proclaims—that
this unique reality not only differs from its manifesta
tion, but is an insolvable mystery.
The conclusion gathers fresh force, out of a crowd
of other things, from his definition of reality as "the
sum total of all that is";* for, as Kant affirms, the
"conception of a sum total of reality is the conception
of a thing in itself, regarded as completely deter-
mined "; and the conception of a thing in itself, /lor-
resco referens, is the conception of the unknowable.
Can it be that monism is based not simply on nou-
mena, but on noumena in the positive sense ? Is it
possible after all that monism is no other than the
beast dualism ?
'
' That which is unknowable in substance, " he says,
" is unreal and non-existent," continuing : "The whole
of reality, with its inexhaustible wealth of problems,
lies within the bounds of knowability, while beyond that
limit is empty nothingness." The question "as to the
cause of existence in general," it would seem, is ad-
missible after all, in his opinion ; for, if nothing is
beyond the bounds of knowability, the existence to
which he refers must lie within them, and must con-
sist of phenomena, to which, as such, the "law of causa-
tion is applicable. " The question as to the cause of ex-
istence whereof this is true, forsooth, not only is admis-
sible, but admits of a ready answer—to wit, the familiar
process of which the product is an abstraction. But
this is not the kind of existence in question. The
existence which is independent of sensation, but on
which sensation depends, is not existence in the ab-
stract, but in the concrete—not the mere idea of exist-
ence, but something existing—not an abstraction, but
a reality : a reality of which the existence is revealed
in the kaleidoscope of mind, but which in its proper
nature, be that what it may, is impenetrable to thought,,
as the objects in a kaleidoscope are impenetrable to
vision. His averments here, the reader will mark, are
mutually contradictory. If existence in general is in-
dependent of causation, as he concedes, it cannot con-
sist of phenomena, and does not lie within the bounds
of knowability, but must lie beyond them ; and if,,
though lying beyond them, it "must be accepted as a
fact," it cannot be "empty nothingness ": it must be
something, and must be unknowable. That is to say,
if the law of causation is not applicable to existence in
general, existence in general is incapable of being
*This definition stands at the head of The Open Court, to whose Editor I
am rejoining ; but in " Fundamental Problems" reality is defined, less aptly,
I think, though not less consistently with my argument, as "the sum total of
aU facts that are, or can become, objects of experience."
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known in its causes, and can be known only as a fact
;
which is the definition of the unknowable.
'
'We cannot comprehend, " he repeats in another re-
lation, "why planets materially exist, and why force
exists inseparably connected with matter. The ma-
terial existence of planets, that their mass endowed
with motion exists at all, is a fact." If we cannot
comprehend "the material existence of planets," we
of course cannot comprehend "material existence" at
large ; which, accordingly, apart from its mere actual-
ity, is unknowable. If, again, we cannot comprehend
"why force exists inseparably connected with matter,"
we cannot comprehend matter or force ; and both, ex-
cepting the fact of their existence, are unknowable
—
not the words, mark you, or the conceptions they sig-
nify (possibly all of which the Editor takes account),
but the external realities from which the conceptions
are drawn. These realities are incomprehensible, he
admits : they lie beyond "the bounds of knowability."
And yet beyond these bounds, he says, is "empty noth-
ingness. " Is then "empty nothingness " incomprehen-
sible ? And can that which is incomprehensible be said
to lie within the grasp of cognition ? What indeed is "a
fact" that "we cannot comprehend" but an unknow-
able reality—a reality known as a fact but not know-
able in its causes? Nothing. The recognition of it is
agnosticism pure and simple. It is the vice of the
Editor's philosophy, as I conceive, that he mistakes
the products of ideation for the external realities which
give rise to them, and in turn mistakes these realities
for nonentities; and this even when, as in the present
instance, he stands face to face with the realities in
their sublimest forms, and seems to sweep his eye across
their measureless breadth, to lift it up to their infinite
height, to fix it on their impenetrable depth. His phi-
losophy banishes m}'stery to enthrone delusion.
The Editor, as befits a good evolutionist, holds
that man, in common with all other organisms, is the
product of development,—the result of the action, re-
action, and interaction of natural forces, which, as the
factors originating consciousness, are external to con-
sciousness ; so that, as the outcome of his doctrine, we
have beyond consciousness an existence which is the
source of our existence, but which, nevertheless, is
nothing, while we are som'ething. We have all heard
of the juggler who climbed a ladder supported by
nothing, and pulled up the ladder after him ; but none
of us, I take it, ever suspected that this audacious
•drollery is a stock piece on the solemn stage of the
imiverse—the roaring farce that relieves the tragedy
of things. jEx nihilo nihil fit used to be accounted
sound philosophy, but our arch-gnostic has changed
all that ; in his hands the maxim reads Ex nihilo aliquid
fit. He unwarily has put the new wine of evolution
into the old bottles of pantheism, with the natural re-
sult, this novel version of the time-honored aphorism
marking one of the lines of fracture in the shivered
bottles. The scriptural warning on this point should
not have escaped the attention of so alert and lucid a
thinker.
The Editor has a good deal to say about the sum
of things—the totality of existence—the All, with a
big A ; which, we may be sure, he brings somehow
(satisfactorily to himself) within the limits of the know-
able. The steps in this particular instance, it turns
out, are only two. He assumes, first, that nature has
nothing in any of its parts, extensive or intensive, that
is essentially different from the part of it accessible to
human comprehension—which assumption, by the way,
begs the question in dispute ; and, secondly, that the
infinite is another name for the indefinite. Grant these
two assumptions, and the wide world passes into the
confines of the knowable, as the huge Afrite in the
Arabian tale entered the fisherman's bottle. But these
assumptions cannot be granted. He does not con-
sistently stand by them himself. In admitting that
sensation is different from the external reality produc-
ing it, he admits that every part of nature has some-
thing not comprehensible by man; and, when he looks
up at that starry heaven which so kindled and awed
the imagination of Kant, he must tacitly recognize that
the indefinite is neither the infinite nor a real copy of
it. Still, he makes these assumptions, and attempts
to maintain them.
"The infinite," he says, "is a symbol for a math-
ematical process. When I count, I may count up to
a hundred or two hundred, to a thousand or to a mil-
lion, or to whatever number I please. If I do not stop for
other reasons, I may count on without stopping—in a
word, into infinity. " Here we have both assumptions,
taken in the airiest manner, the suggestion being that
what man does not understand is as understandable as
what he does understand, and that all he has to do to
comprehend the sum of things is to go on knowing
and to know, as far as he pleases, and whenever he
stops, though but from weariness or caprice, he may
congratulate himself that he sees through the All, or
as much of it as he likes, which is the same thing ; it
is as easy as counting, or lying. " This will never do.
"
One may realize the indefinite by stopping when
he pleases ; but, if he would realize the infinite, he
must go on forever, which would be likely to put a
finite being to his shifts. The indefinite admits of
limit, conditional, though not unconditional ; but the
infinite admits of no limit, conditional or unconditional.
Our gnostic's free and easy logic, if he will pardon
me, misses fire. He aims at the infinite, but brings
down only the indefinite ; the infinite remains safely
perched in its cosmic eyrie.
" Infinitude is never an accomplished process," he
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tells us. It is never a process at all, but always a prop-
erty, abstracted from infinite things ; it is not a pro-
cess, but the product of a process, and of a perfectly
accomplished one. Trying to count "into infinity,"
however, were anybody mad enough to try it, would
be a "process," and undeniabl}' "never an accom-
plished process "; seeing that it would take infinite
time to accomplish it.
He appears to look down on the infinite as "a
mathematical term. " Yes, it is a term in mathematics
;
it is also a term in philosophy; and, what is more to
the purpose, it has the same meaning in both. Whether
applied to quantity or being, it means that which is
greater than any assignable thing of the same kind.
And surely a thing is not to be made nothing of be-
cause it is so great as to have no conceivable limits.
It may be suggested, as Spinoza held, that the infinite
sua gencre is not the absolutely infinite ; but, in respect
to existence, this distinction is lost, the infinite suo
genere, as comprehending all possible modes of infinity,
being also the absolutely infinite.
The infinite he also calls an "abstract idea. " It
is an abstract idea, to be sure ; but it is abstracted
from realities—infinite space, infinite time, and, above
all, the infinite existence that fills both. Infinity is an
abstraction, but infinite existence, the Editor himself
being judge, is the synonym of reality—the All of
monism.
'
' We look upon the forms of our existence, " he says,
"as upon a specimen, so to speak, of the forms of ex-
istence in general." Here, once more, I may note,
he recognizes, in Kantian phrase, existence in itself,
taking its reality for granted, and going so far as to
hint at the possibility of bringing it within the bounds
of the knowable ; but this in passing. The forms of
infinite existence, to return, are themselves infinite, if
we may reason on the matter at all ; for the proper-
ties of a thing partake of its nature, and to assume
that the forms of the infinite are finite would be to
abolish the infinite. A specimen, furthermore, pre-
supposes a class of things like itself, to which it be-
longs, and of which it is a representative; but finite
forms do not belong to the class of infinite forms, and
for this reason cannot be specimens of them. The
minutest part of a parabola, indeed, represents the
whole, though produced to infinity, but only because
the property of a parabola is assigned by definition,
and belongs entire to every point in the curve. As,
however, existence does not receive its properties from
definition, or pack them in barren points, whose end-
less iteration develops no new property, we are not at
liberty to assume that we know all the properties or
the whole of any property even of finite existence, far
less that the complex of these properties undergoes no
change in the forms of infinite existence. The notion
that infinite existence is merely finite existence infi-
nitely repeated has no ground in reason. It would be
equally admissible, saying the least, to hold that infi-
nite existence is finite existence changed qualitatively,
as it were, by means of infinite quantification—finite
existence not infinitely extended but infinitely trans •
formed. But no particular predication of infinite ex-
istence is legitimate ; infinite existence is unknowable,
and that, once ascertained, ends the question. To
pursue it would be to go astray, without star or com-
pass, in the night and chaos of self-contradiction.
Wherefore, infinite existence, unlike tea or wheat,
cannot be sampled. We know that it is ; but what it
is we know not, and by the constitution of our facul-
ties are incapable of knowing. It lies beyond the
possible grasp of cognition. The simple transcend-
ency of this awful something—its existence beyond
consciousness, and independent of consciousness
—
would paralyze comprehension ; but when to its trans-
cendency we add its infinity, and superadd its abso-
luteness, the most confirmed gnostic, even of the mo-
nistic species, must begin to suspect, one would think,
that there is something in heaven and earth not dreamt
of in his philosophy.
It is time to close. But in closing I must do my-
self and the Editor of The Open Court the justice of
paying afresh the tribute of my admiration to his rare
excellence as a writer. The energetic yet easy play
of his faculties, the massive simplicity of his style, the
mingled sympathy and reverence of his tone, his im-
perturbable temper, and his masterly lucidity, are above
praise. Even his errors, or what I hold to be his
errors, are more improving than the truths of most
writers. I must not forget, however, that I am closing.
My summary shall be short ; and, to this end, parti-
ally ad hominem. Monism is founded on the oneness
of the All. As the sum total of reality, the All is trans-
cendent ; as illimitable in space and time, it is infinite ;
as dependent on nothing outside of itself, it is ab-
solute. Transcendent, infinite, absolute, the All, by
this triple token, is the Unknowable ; on which, such
being the case, monism rests as its foundation. And
so the leopard of agnosticism, fulfilhng in a way the
roseate prophecy of Isaiah, lies down with the kid of
gnosticism—the latter inside the former. "Let us
have Peace."
ONTOLOGY AND POSITIVISM.
The basal idea of Positivism or Positive Monism is
that it takes its stand on facts ; and there is unquestion-
ably no thinker of the present age, who is imbued with
the scientific spirit of the time, that would offer any
objection to this principle. Yet former philosophies
did not take the same ground. They tried to find a
footing in empty space ; they attempted to explain
2 144 THE OPKN COURT.
facts by deriving them from some abstract conception
that they postulated. Their favorite starting-point
was the idea of abstract existence. Hence their method
is called ontology, which may be translated as meaning
" thought-structures of abstract existence. " The vaguer
the broader, the more general and metaphysical this
abstract conception was, the deeper and profounder
an ontological system appeared to be, and the more it
was appreciated by the astonished public.
One of the ablest, and certainly the most famous,
among ontologists was Hegel. Hegel started with the
abstract idea of being or existence in general, and
claimed that this concept in its emptiness was iden-
tical with non-existence. Abstract being, he said, is
at the same time an absolute negation of concrete
being ; it is pure nothingness. These two concepts
accordingly are in one respect absolutely identical, in
another respect absolutely contradictory. Each one
disappears immediately into its opposite. The oscil-
lation between both is the pure becoming, das reine
Werden, which, if it be a transition from non-existence
to existence, \s czWeA E?itsiehen, "growing, originating,
waxing," and if it be a transition from existence to
non existence, is called Vergehen, "decrease, decay,
waning." Having arrived, by this ingenious method
of philosophical sleight of hand at the concept of
Becoming, Hegel's ontology touched bottom. From
the Utopia of non-existence, above the clouds, he got
down to the facts of real life ; and here he applies to
everything the same method of a thesis, an antithesis,
and the combination of both.
We would be obliged to go into detail if we in-
tended to show how truly grand was the application
of his method to logic, to history, to natural science,
to art, to aesthetics, to religion, and to theology.
Here is not the place for doing this. Yet, while ob-
jecting to the ontological method, we wish incidentally
to emphasize the fact, that Hegel was one of the
greatest, boldest, and most powerful thinkers of all
times, whatever his mistakes may have been, and from
whatsoever standpoint we choose to look upon his phi-
losophy.
Ontology starts from abstract ideas and comes
down to facts. Positivism, on the contrary, starts
from facts and rises to abstract ideas. Abstract ideas,
according to the positive view, are derived from and
represent certain general features of facts. Ontology
is bent upon explaining the existence of facts from non-
existence, and ontologists therefore regard it as their
duty to bridge over in their imagination the chasm
between nothingness and something. Positivism does
not require such mistaken procedure. It takes the
facts as data and possesses in their existence the mate-
rial out of which rise the sciences and philosophy.
Philosophy is no longer a pure thought-structure of
abstract being, but a general survey of the sciences as
a conception of the universe, based upon experience.
Ontological systems did not disappear and lose their
influence over mankind suddenly, but dissolved them-
selves first into a state of philosophical despair. The
uselessness and sterility of the ontological method
were more and more recognized and found their philo-
sophical expression in agnosticism.
Agnosticism is the most modern form of the ob-
solete method of ontological philosophy. The agnostic
philosopher has discovered a concept that is broader
and vaguer even than that of "existence in general."
This concept is the Unknowable. Something that is
real and at the same time absolutely unknowable is a
self-contradiction. But never mind. That makes the
idea the vaguer and it will thus be more easily turned
to advantage. Agnostics are never afraid of arriving at
self-contradictory statements, at unknowabilities, or
at insolvable problems— these three terms mean
the same thing—for they are just the things they be-
lieve in.*
Positivism regards the construction of philosophy
upon abstract ideas as idle effort. Instead of coming
down from an abstract conception as if it were out of
a balloon to the solid ground of facts, positivism takes
facts as its data. It starts from facts and arranges
them properly in good order. It derives its abstract
conceptions not by a theological revelation nor by in-
tuition and metaphysical inspiration, but by the
method of mental abstraction. And it discards all
those abstract conceptions which have not been
derived from facts. Philosophical knowledge is not
at all a going beyond facts, but it is the proper and
systematic arrangement of facts, so that they do not
appear as incoherent single items without rhyme or
reason, but as one intelligible whole in which every
part appears in concord with every other.
*
* *
The principle of Positivism, certainly, is very
simple, but its application is by no means easy. Even
the mere statement of facts requires much care and
exactness, while their systematic arrangement as sci-
entific knowledge is the privilege only of a few ex-
ceptional thinkers.
What are facts? Facts are all the events that
take place ; the thoughts and acts of living beings as
* Agnosticism blindfolds us in clear daylight. I wish every agnostic would
read the following passage from our great American Logician, C. S. Peirce :
" One singular deception, which often occurs, is to mistake the sensation
produced by our own unclearness of thought for a character of the object we
are thinking. Instead of perceiving that the obscurity is purely subjactive,
we fancy that we contemplate a quality of the object which is essentially mys-
terious ; and if our conception be afterward presented to us in a clear form
we do not recognize it as the same, owing to the absence of the feeling of un-
intelligibility. So long as this deception lasts, it obviously puts an impassable
barrier in the way of perspicuous thinking; so that it equally interests the
opponents of rational thought to perpetuate it, and its adherents to guard
against it."
—
\The Illustrations of ihc Logic of Science, {See Popitiar Science
Monthly, 1877, p. 291.)]
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well as the motions of not-living things, great and
small ; the oscillations of atoms and the movements of
suns ; in short all natural processes that happen. The
central fact among all other facts is to every one the
activity of his own consciousness. This central fact,
however, must not be supposed to be either the ulti-
mate fact or the simplest fact. To call any fact ulti-
mate is not justifiable, because if any single fact
among facts is ultimate, all facts are ultimate. Facts,
if they are facts at all, are equally real ; their reality
cannot be regarded as of a greater or less degree. To
look upon consciousness as a simple fact would imply,
that it is eternal, which is contrary to our experience.
Consciousness is a very complicated fact ; it is the
sum of many smaller facts and must be supposed to
be the result of a co-operation of innumerable pro-
cesses.
This, however, is stated only incidentally in oppo-
sition to certain philosophers who believe in the sim-
plicity of consciousness and build upon this hypothe-
sis a grand philosophical system called idealism. For
our present purpose, in considering consciousness as
the central fact among all other facts, it is of no con-
sequence. It is here sufficient to state that conscious-
ness being to every one of us the basis of our knowl-
edge of facts, need not at all be the originator of
facts; being the centre of our intellectual world, it
need not at all be an indivisible unit or a mathematical
point. Facts are stated as facts when they are rep-
resented in consciousness, and the means by which
facts are represented in consciousness are sensations.
This is to say: The philosophical problem according
to positivism is the arrangement of all knowledge
into one harmonious system which will be a unitary
conception of the world and can serve as a basis for
ethics.
A unitary conception of the world implies and pre-
supposes the idea of a continuity of nature, which,
it is true, has not as yet been proved in all its details.
Nevertheless, it is more than simply probable. The
continuity of nature is the indispensable ideal of sci-
ence; every progress of science is, rightly considered,
nothing but an additional evidence of the truth that
nature does not contradict herself ; she is continuous
and self-consistent. There are no facts, proven to be
facts, that can overthrovO^ the ideal of a continuity of
nature. Therefore, the solution of the problem to
construct a unitary system of knowledge, we most em-
phatically declare, is not only possible, it is also ne-
cessary, it is an indispensable duty of man as a think-
ing being; and its realization is the very life of sci-
ence. If a systematization of knowledge were im-
possible, science would become impossible, and phi-
losophy would be resolved into useless vagaries.
To sum up. The philosophical problem, accord-
ing to ontology, is to derive existence from non-exist-
ence. Agnosticism, finding the problem of deriving
something from nothing insoluble, declares it to be an
inscrutable mystery. Positivism maintains that the
problem is illegitimate. Taking its stands upon facts,
positivism can dispense with the salto mortale of
ontology. p. c.
POSITIVE SCIENCE VERSUS GNOSTICISM AND
AGNOSTICISM.
IN ANSWER TO MR. SHIPMAN'S CRITICISM
GNOSTICISM."
'AGNOSTICISM VS.
I. WHENCE COME FACTS ?
Facts, we declare, are the data o£ knowledge ; and the ex-
istence of things, the existence of nature, must be regarded as a
fact. Here Mr. Shipman thinks that he has got me in a fix.
Whence do we get the facts ?
The law of cause and effect applies to things only, i. e., to
the forms of existence, but not to existence in general, as I admit.
Ergo, Mr. Shipman declares, existence in general is one thing and
its manifestation another : existence in general is free from causa-
tion, is absolute and unknowable, while the manifestations of
existence, its forms, are knowable.
The law of cause and effect, as defined and explained in Fund-
amental Prohlems, is the formula under which we comprise all the
changes that take place in the world of actual existence. The law
of cause and effect does not explain why matter exists or why
energy exists, but it explains how and why one form changes into
another form.
The law of cause and effect does not admit of any other ap-
plication ; for instance, it cannot be applied to the question " Why
is there any existence at all ? " We can trace the chain of causes
and effects up to a special, for instance the present, state of things,
and we can comprehend why things and their arrangements are
as they are, but to ssarch for a cause of their existence at large,
why they materially exist at all is illegitimate. To comprehend
material existence in this way is impossible, because it is inad-
missible. There is, however, no concession on my part, no ad-
mission, as Mr. Shipman declares *
The law of cause and effect applies to changes of form and as
soon as we apply it otherwise, we must in the end arrive at con-
tradictions—which in my mihd do not prove the dogma of agnos-
ticism, but are a sign that there is something wrong in our logic.
The law of cause and effect is often erroneously applied to abstract
conceptions. But it is wrong to speak of the cause of ' ' whiteness "
or the cause of " the existence of the world in general." I can in-
vestigate the cause that made a thing white ; and I can explain the
reason why a certain thing now appears to us, for instance, as
white. But there is no cause of " whiteness in general." I can ex-
plain the process by which we arrive at the conception of white-
ness. But the application of the concepts cause and effect to ab-
stract ideas (as I employ the term cause) is as nonsensical as
if I should speak of the undulations of goodness, or the heat of
* Mr. Shipman's quotation that " we cannot comprehend why planets
materially exist," etc., makes a diflferent impression when considered in its
context. Six lines above the quoted passage we read, on p. 121: "There is
nothing to be comprehended in existence in general. It is a matter of e.^-
perience simply, to be stated as a fact. By the form, for instance, of planets,
we understand their shape as globes (or rather as spheroids) ; by the form of
their motions we understand their paths, which are conic sections. We can-
not comprehend why planets materially exist, and why force exists inseparably
connected with matter. The material existence of planets, that their mass
endowed mith motion exists at all, is a fact ; but their existence as planets,
why they exist as spheroids, and why they travel in paths of conic sections can-
very well be comprehended."
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straight lines, or the changes of form that mathematical points
undergo. The question how the different forms of existence came
about, how they were caused, is legitimaie ; but the question as to
the cause of existence in general is illegitimate.
But, given facts as the data from which philosophy and sci-
ence start, and recognizing that they must come from somewhere,
the question still remains. How do facts or how did facts originate ?
This question may be viewed in two different ways ;
(i) How is the present state of the world to be explained from
a former state ? Especially, How did its complicated cosmic har-
mony and manifold variety of form come about ? and
(2) How is it that things exist at all ? Why is there existence
instead of non-existence ? Why is there something instead of
nothing ?
These are the two interpretations of which the question
" Whence come facts ? " admits. In the former shape the.question
has found its scientific answer in the Kant-Laplace hypothesis
of the origin of the solar system and in the Lamarck-Darwinian
theory of evolution which was devised to account for the origin
of species. In the latter shape the question has also found a sci-
entific answer. The answer is formulated in the law of the con-
servation of matter and energy. The answer is that matter and
energy are indestructible and uncreatable; they are eternal. ' ' Eter-
nal " does not signify anything mysterious or incomprehensible ;
it simply denotes something that exists, that has existed, and that
will continue to exist.
No other answer can be expected to the question " Whence do
facts come ? " Mr. Shipman does not seem to consider the law of
the conservation of matter and energy a sufficient solution of the
problem. He would fain make us believe that the substitution of
something unknowable is an answer more satisfactory than the
law of the conservation of matter and energy. But it is not. The
Unknowable explains nothing ; and if one adopts the positive con-
ception of philosophy, the Unknowable becomes quite a superflu-
ous idea, which can most easily be dispensed with—nay more
easily than it can be accepted. There is no place for it in a
system of positive philosophy.
II. MYSTERY AND DELUSION.
Mr. Shipman says :
" It is the vice of the Editor's philosophy, as I conceive, that he mistakes
the products of ideation for the external realities which give rise to them, and
in turn mistakes these realities for non-entities ;...."
I do not mistake the products of ideation for external realities.
On the contrary, I have repeatedly declared that ideas are rep-
resentations of things. Metaphysical essences and absolute ex-
istences are all that I have declared to be non-entities. The ban-
ishment of mystery, in my mind, is the main duty of science and
philosophy, and I am not at all astonished that a mystic looks upon
the attempt to expel mystery as a delusion.
III. THE SOURCE.
Mr. Shipman sums up the outcome of my doctrine in the fol-
lowing statement .
" We have beyond consciousness an existence which is tlie source of our
existence, but which, nevertheless, is nothing, while we are something."
This is simply a gross misstatement. I never said anything
like it. I mentioned the word source in one connection only. I
said there is no source of existeace—no source of the universe.
The story of "the juggler who climbs a ladder supported by noth-
ing and pulls the ladder after him," is applicable not to positivism
but to that class of philosophers who in search for a source of ex-
istence find themselves urged to search further for a source of the
source and so od infittitum.
IV. THE THINKING SUBJECT A PART OF NATURE.
Mr. Shipman seems to suppose that the thinking subject is
essentially different from the rest of nature. At least he objects
to " the assumption " that the thinking subject is a part of nature,
and that the form of the thinking subject is, as it were, a specimen
of the form of nature. He does not disprove my position. So I
need not take the trouble to refute his view,
V. THE INFINITE AND THE INDEFINITE.
The infinite is by no means another name for the indefinite.
Mr. Shipman, it appears, in declaring that I had said it is, did not
understand the solution of the question as proposed in Fiinclamental
Problems. The two conceptions, the infinite and the indefinite,
are quite distinct. It is not my logic that is " free and easy," but
Mr. Shipman's presentation of my views
The infinite is a symbol to signify a process without a limit.
If I count up to a hundred or to a thousand and stop there, I do
not reach the infinite. I never said that I reach it by stopping in-
definitely, as Mr. Shipman declares. Only, if I count on without
stopping, I call the process infinite.
Infinitude is not a thing, it is not an object ; it is a process
without a limit. A process carried on without a limit, is never
finished, it is never a round, compact, concrete reality, but is
conceived as being in a course of constant progress.
Mr. Shipman tells us that the infinite is "a property ab-
stracted from infinite things." I must confess, (i) that I never met
with an infinite thing in my life, and (2) that I do not believe in
the existence of infinite things. Time and Space are infinite to be
sure ; but time and space are not things ; and infinitude is not ab-
stracted from Time and Space, but attributed to them. Space is
not, as metaphysical philosophers imagine, a large box possessing
the inexplicable property of infinitude, and containing the world
within it. Space is the possibility of motion in all directions. If
the point A moves in a straight line, it is possible for it to con-
tinue to move without stopping. We can imagine the process to
be continued without a limit. The same holds good for every line
in every possible direction. This is all we can mean by the idea
that space is infinite.
It is the same with Time. Metaphysical philosophers imagine
that Time is a mysterious something in which all. events and hap-
penings take place. But Time is not a thing. It is no more a
thing than Space is.
We observe changes taking place around us. Time is nothing
but a measure of these changes. We employ as measures such
changes as appear most regular, such as days and years. But
there is no time apart from changes. Since we can imagine that
some changes will always take place, and, even if they did not
take place, since we could measure the time of a supposed rest
by some certain measure, (days, years, millenniums, billenniums,
etc.), we say that Time is infinite. This is all that we can mean
by the idea that Time is infinite.
If Mr. Shipman means by " infinite existence" the truth that
existence will continue to be existence into infinity, (viz., infinite
time, or eternity), I gladly adopt the term. If he means that ex-
istence in its extension is infinite, I must hesitate to adopt it. If
the infinite extension of existence means something immeasurable
to us with the means of measurement at our command, I have also
no objection. But if it means that the amount of energy and of
matter in the sum total of all the sidereal systems of the universe
is absolutely infinite, I must ask Mr. Shipman on what ground he
makes such a bold assumption.
VI. KANT AND DUALISM.
Mr. Shipman's quotation from Kant proves that the latter
believed in things in themselves. I know very well that Kant has
a phase in his development which is thoroughly dualistic. But we
are not discussing Kant here, so I waive the point.
VII. ARE THINGS IMPENETRABLE TO THOUGHT?
Mr. Shipman says: "The existence of reality is revealed in the
kaleidoscope of mind, but its proper nature, be that what it may, is
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impenetrable to thought, as the objects in a kaleidoscope are im-
penetrable to vision."
This simile throws light upon the difference between Mr.
Shipman's conceptions and mine. I do not want either thought
or vision to penetrate things. It would be but consistent with
Mr. Shipman's agnosticism to declare that things are invisible.
We see the outside of things only, and therefore objects are
impenetrable to vision.
If Mr. Shipman's expression, "things are impenetrable to
thought," is used in a figurative sense, meaning thereby that we
cannot see in our mind the inside of things and the laws that
describe* their formation (indeed, it can not be interpreted in any
other sense), the idea is as untrue as that science is identical with
ignorance.
We cannot look into the inside of people ; yet a good physician
who is not an ignorant quack but combines knowledge with ability
and sound judgment, can and does penetrate with his thought into
the organs of his patient. What would be the value of science, if
that were not so !
A philosophy that levels all degrees of wisdom to the miser-
able ignorabiiiiKs, will come to the rescue of quacks and comfort
their conscience with Solomon's great saw : ' ' All is vanity ! Know-
ledge is vanity ! Wisdom is vanity ! "
Does not the botanist see more in a tree than people ignorant
of the wonders of plant-life ? Do not our thoughts penetrate into
the ground and do we not know that the roots are there that
nourish the tree ? Does not the mind of the scientist perceive the
activity of the solar light which raises every little drop of sap that
enters the leaves and blossoms to build up their structures ? And
are not the laws that describe these changes present in the mind
of a man familiar with the subject so that he can upon the whole
foretell what will happen, if some of the conditions were altered ?
If that is no penetration of thought into things, pray what is it ?
VIII. UNKNOWABLE MACHINES AND THEIR INVENTORS.
Are those things unknowable also that we made ourselves ?
Were steam and the laws of steam impenetrable to the thoughts
of a Watt and to a Stephenson ? Is a watch unknowable to a
watchmaker ? Is the Eiffel tower and its structure unknowable to
Mr. Eiffel ? Is the phonograph an unknowable instrument to Mr.
Edison ? Is he hopelessly ingnorant about the materials and their
qualities of which its different parts consist ? Must he not have a
very exact and an exhaustive knowledge of the laws according
to which the wonderful little machine acts ?
Mr. Wake in his thoughtful essay God in Evolution {The Open
Court, No. 121, p. 1998) brings out very strongly this point against
agnosticism. We quote the following passage :
"To a philosopher
phenomena of external
into states of conscious
or directs the forces of
tudy, or even in the presence of the ordinary
all our knowledge may appear to be resolvable
,
but not to him who uses the qualities of matter
-e for working out some great useful design. The
sculptor or artist can give outward form to his thought, and so can the engineer
who tunnels under mountains or bridges arms of the sea. The discoveries of
science, and their application in the manufacture and formation of works of
art, are not consistent with the view that external phenomena are not truly
represented in consciousness, whatever maybe said of astronomy or any other
science as the formulation of the laws
IX. REVERENT AGNOSTICISM.
In popular opinion I iind that one of the strongest arguments
in favor of Agnosticism is the preconceived idea that familiarity
We purposely use the expression " natural laws dcscrib>f," and purposely
avoid the term *^ govern ^^ in this connection. The expression "gravitation
governs the motions of celestial bodies " gives rise to the misconception that
the law of gravity is a power behind the phenomena of gravity. Thus we
mystify ourselves by our own language and look upon gravitation as a meta-
physical something that like a wizard rules the behavior of atoms and planets.
The so-called natural laws are not laws, properly speaking, but comprehen-
sive formulas which systematically and methodically describe certain natural
processes.
breeds contempt. If a schoolboy gains a superficial knowledge
of astronomy, the astronomer loses in his eyes the respect he
before possessed. The mysterious, the uncomprehended, the un-
known alone seem to command man's reverence.
Familiarity with scientific truth breeds contempt in him alone
whose knowledge is superficial ; all thorough knowledge will raise
admiration and wonder and awe. Knowledge dispels superstitious
awe and foolish fear, but the truly religious spirit, the recognition
of the sublime in nature, is not lost through knowledge; it receives
its only solid food whereon to live and to grow.
The savage will cease to worship a thunderer if he knows that
thunder and lightening are produced through electrical tension.
In that sense familiarity with a subject will breed contempt. But
the scientist understanding the laws and the workings of electri-
city, will be more impressed with the grandeur of natural laws
than the poor pagan, who bows down in the dust before the flash
that shoots forth from the clouds.
It is one of the gravest mistakes of Agnosticism as presented
by Mr. Herbert Spencer to base religion upon the Unknown, and
—
in order to give to religion a foundation which even the scientist dare
not touch—to assert the existence of an Unknowable and recom-
mend it as the basis of the future religion. The worship of the Un-
known is no religion, but superstition, and the proposed worship of
a chimera, such as the Unknowable, it seems to me, is no improve-
ment upon paganism. The pagan indeed does not worship the
thunder because he does not know what it is, but because he does
know that it might kill him. He worships the thunder because he
is afraid of it, because of the known and obvious dangers connected
with it, which he feels unable to control. He worships that which
powerfully influences his life and which he cannot alter or fashion
as it pleases him. Religion, true religion, is the recognition of the
unalterable laws of nature to which we must adapt ourselves. It
is above all the recognition of the unalterable moral law which
builds up human society and made man a moral being—and the
recognition of these laws implies the lear of breaking them and
the confidence that a community in which they are obeyed, will
flourish and grow and prosper, and its citizens shall enjoy the
benefit thereof.
Occasionally I meet with the strange expression "reverent
agnosticism." Reverence for truth is certainly better shown by
earnest and bold inquiry than by a halting and submissive re-
spect—as if truth were unapproachable.
X. CONCLUSION.
In conclusion I have to state that the difference in the prin-
ciples from which Agnosticism on the one side, and Positivism on
the other, start, is so great, that the very meanings of words and
terms are affected by it. Words like cognition, knowledge, manifes-
tation, properties of things (i. e., qualities), infinite, etc., have ac-
quired different shades of meaning. Every one of these terms,
being definite and clear in Positivism, is overshadowed by the
dim mystery of the Unknowable in Agnosticism ; every one of
them partakes of that holiness which Agnostics attach to the ob-
scure, the vague, the incomprehensible.
We are informed by Mr. Shipman that the leopard Agnosti-
cism has swallowed what he believes to be the kid Gnosticism ; and
he hints that the kid Gnosticism is the positive philosophy pro-
pounded by The Open Court. The leopard has swallowed some-
thing, no doubt, that it cannot digest ; for the diagnosis shows
all the symptoms of the disease of agnosticism. What, indeed, is
it but a desperate case of philosophical dyspepsia ? p. c.
" Man must hold firm to the belief that what appears incom-
prehensible to him is comprehensible, since otherwise he will not
investigate."
—
Goethe.
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THE AGNOSTICISM OF MODESTY.*
Agnosticism is a most praiseworthy position if it signifies
Socratic modesty concerning all those problems which we have
not as yet solved. But then, of course, it is a personal attitude,
not a philosophy ; it is simply a confession of private ignorance,
which will be of great service in dispelling that ignorance.
Darwin when urged to state whether he was a theist or not,
uses the word agnosticism in this sense, saying: "I think that
generally (and more as I grow older), but not always, that an
Agnostic would be the more correct description of my state of
mind,"i. e., more than a theist. And even here Darwin feels
constrained to add the three little words " hut not always"
Darwin was no philosopher, and all his utterances concerning
philosophical and religious problems were made most unwillingly
and with great reserve. The term agnostic is characteristic of
this reserve. It was intended as the e.\pression of his personal
attitude and not as a philosophical dogma. In his own province
of research Darwin certainly did not adopt the principle that the
origin of the species was an inscrutable mystery. He showed his
reverence towards truth not in an overawed reserve but in coura-
geous investigation.
Darwin says in his preface to the Descent of Man :
"It is those who know little and not those who know much, who
so positively assert that this or that problem will never he solved by
science."
Who dares to cite Darwin's authority in favor of Agnosticism
—save the agnosticism of personal modesty—in the face of that
passage ?
Professor Ernst Haeckel is again and again erroneously quoted
as an authority in support of agnosticism. When I visited him in
Jena last summer, he very warmly expressed his sympathy with
the attitude of The Open Court for taking such a decided and un-
mistakable stand against the ignorabimiis of agnosticism. He called
my attention in this connection to his own controversies with
Virchow and Du Bois-Reymond (especially Freie IVissenschaft und
freie Lehre.)
The first number of The Open Court, p. 17, contains the fol-
lowing quotation from Haeckel without reference :
" I believe that my Monistic convictions agree in all essential points with
that natural philosophy which in England is represented as Agnosticism "
Professor Haeckel declared that he did not remember ever
having written a sentence to that purport, and I come to the con-
clusion that there is something wrong about the quotation.
The agnosticism of modesty is a great thing, for it gives a
stimulus to investigation. However, the dogmatic agnosticism
which establishes a belief in the Unknowable erects a barrier to
scientific inquiry. Agnosticism is truly, as the French express it,
a citl de sac. It leads us into a blind alley where no further ad-
vancement is possible and maintains that there the world is at an
end. All great enquirers were agnostics of the former class, but
the agnostics of the latter class are the great mystery-mongers
of a pseudo-philosophy, such as Plotinus and Jacob Bbhme,
who may have been very profound dreamers, very original geniuses,
but not clear thinkers, not true philosophers. p. c.
TO THE MEMORY OF GEORGE W. DE LONG.f
BY A CLASSMATE, MAY 6, 1882.
Sent from the 'Lena Delta,"
Briefly the message said :
" Captain De Long and party
Found by us here ; all dead."
* Written with reference to several scattered items which appeared of
e in various liberal journals.
t Read at the annual dinner of the U S. Naval Academy GraduatesAssocia-
n. Copyright, rSS/.
Dead ! and the world that learns it
Feels, though the story's old,
A gloom as of night and silence,
The waste and the bitter cold ;
Feels for a moment vaguely
That somewhere, far away,
Men that were brave lie frozen,
Then turns to its toil or play.
For the great WDrld bears of sorrow
But a feeble, feeble part
;
To know of all men's grieving
Would break the great world's heart.
Dead by the frozen river !
Twenty long years ago
I may have heard him giving
Its length and course, as though
This one for him meant nothing
More than the rest he gave.
We knew all lands and waters,
But none could name his grave.
Poor fellow ! The winds and currents
Had taken us far apart.
But the boy's good-will, remembered.
Told of the man's grgat heart.
Hail to the dead, that, dying,
Keep the old cause alive !
Score one for the side of honor,
And the class of " Sixty-five."
Yea, though the crowd may mock me.
Though the carping few deride,
I'll own that a comrade's valor
Fills my whole soul with pride.
The lowliest name that's written
Where the graves lie most obscure,
Gets light from the golden letter
On the shaft that shall endure.
Bring me no canting theories
To prove that the spirit bred
Of fellowship and honor
Should die with the old things dead.
They well may fear and hate it
Who, scornful of worth, conspire
To cover us all with sewage.
And fish in the common mire.
For the men that stand united
In sacrifice and toil.
Are an insult to the pirates
Whose only bond is spoil.
Leaving a sword left idle
Home in a land at peace.
He shipped with his brave companions
For the war that can never cease ;
War with the waste unconquered,
War with the depth and height,
War with the false triumphant.
War for the fact and light.
" What is the use ?" men ask us
;
" What can we hope to know,
More than that man can conquer
The storm and the ice and the snow ?
'
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"What is the use ?" 'Twere useful,
If only to give us an hour
Of rest from your weary gabble
Of stocks and of pork and flour
;
Useful to show the nations
That still, when honor calls.
Our flag has stars on azure,
And not three gilded balls
;
Useful to teach a lesson
To the puling dolts who'd wed
The lily of the liver
To the laurel of the head.
But think of the past ; remember
How much that we are to-day,
Comes from the strange devotion
Of lives that were "thrown away."
Sow, and then reap and garner.
Hoard and be rich ; but own
That wisdom has used the folly
That lives not by bread alone.
On many a bootless venture
Many a sail's unfurled ;
But some that start for India,
Find on their way a world.
Heedless of good or evil.
Something within the soul
Points to the great unknown
As a needle to the Pole ;
Points and impels us onward,
Seeking what lies beyond
With courage the " wise " call folly.
And faith that the fool deems fond.
Sons of our alma mattei\
' Youngest of those who serve.
Cherish his name forever
;
So shall you well deserve.
Trust to the truth and follow.
Hopeful and strong and brave ;
For when all faith else is shaken,
This is the faith shall save.
Washington, D. C. Louis Belrose, Jr.
correspondence! ^
THE INDO-EUROPEAN AND THE NEGRO.
To the Editor of The Open Court :—
History repeats itself, and the dictum of chief-justice Taney
that "the negro has no rights which the white man is bound to
respect " finds new and striking illustration in the proposition that
the interests of the white race demand his compulsory emigration
out of the only country which be has known for two hundred and
seventy years. Just glance at this page of his history ; To gratify the
greed of Indo-Europeans the negro was stolen from his African home
more than two and a half centuries ago and reduced to slavery.
He was during this time accounted and treated no better than a
thing, a dog. He was in fact in the eye of the law chattel prop-
erty. The system of chattel slavery was maintained by the Indo-
European race until it imperilled the life of the Republic. To
save the Union the slave was made a soldier, to save a political
party the former chattel was turned into a citizen. And now on
the plea of preserving free institutions and the purity of the Indo-
European race, the right of the negro to live where he was born,
and where eight generations of his ancestors have lived before
him, is boldly denied. Forty years ago it was asserted often
enough that this was a "white man's government." This old as-
sertion is now bettered. For, translated by Prof. Cope, it reads :
'
' This is a white man's country." But who made it a white man's
country rather than a red man's or a yellow man's or a black
man's country ? The red race was here before and the black race
came simultaneously with his Indo-European oppressor. What
but the law of might makes America a white man's country, just
as the law of might made her government a generation ago a white
man's government ? In his relations with the negro and the In-
dian ihe white man's "lean" has always measured the white
man's "I may." It was this good old principle which planted
African slavery in America ; it is the same principle invoked by
Prof. Cope to plant a greater wrong under the ribs of the old.
Can a race any more than an individual man pursue with impunity
a career of brutal and calculating selfishness ? Is this the revela-
tion which science makes " to the student of species-character in
body and mind ? " It is not possible for a strong race after in-
flicting the most erroneous miseries and wrongs upon a weak race
through nearly three centuries, to terminate its relations and re-
sponsibilities to it by an act of final and transcendent selfishness
and iniquity and then go on its way as if no wrong were done
—
aye advance the faster and the more for it. Is that a specimen of
national morality with which the United States are to enlighten
and lead the world ? Is this a way to preserve its Indo-European
purity of blood by such a collossal corruption of the resources of
its moral life ? For the peace of the realm and the purity of the
holy Catholic worship the Huguenots were driven from France.
For the peace of the country and the purity of the Indo-European
race more than seven millions of colored people are to be deported
to an utterly strange continent, to which for seventy years they
have strenuously protested they do not wish to be sent. Is this
the kind of liberty which republics cultivate in common with des-
potism, the liberty of the strong to execute without check their
will on the weak ? Let me tell Prof. Cope that an act like the one
which he advocates would be productive of an amount of moral
degeneracy on the part of his race, which no mere physical con-
tact and mingling of whites and blacks could possibly work. Have
the wrongs, which a superior race visits upon an inferior, no
adverse effect upon that race's evolution from lower to higher
levels of race-life. I have yet to learn that the practice of justice,
the recognition of another's rights, the protection of the weak by
the powerful have not in themselves virtue to raise races—even
the Indo-European race to a height which mere flesh and blood
force cannot attain. An initial wrong has power to taint the soul's
blood to the remotest issue. It is therefore this contamination of
the spiritual currents of a people, which even the Indo-European
race ought above every thing to dread and guard against. The
wrongs done the negro cannot be redressed by an act of final and
tremendous enormity such as this country would be guilty of were
it to do what Prof. Cope urges it to do. Our posterity a hundred
years hence will, I doubt not, regard us as half barbarian, and as
proof that we were they, I fancy, will only have to point to the pro-
position of an accomplished student of science, for the compulsory
emigration of seven millions of people from their homes and coun-
try for the preposterous purpose of preserving freedom for the
white race and the purity of the Indo-European blood in the
United States ! Archibald H. Grimlie.
Hyde Park, Mass.
HEADS OR TAILS.
To t/te Editor of The Open Coitrt :—
In a recent number of The Open Court there appeared an
article on the mathematical chances of heads or tails in the succes-
sive throws of a coin.
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The author would lead one to think that the chances of head
or tail in any one throw are affected by the results of previous
throws.
This is a mistake, as would in fact appear from the metl^gd of
explanation lised, had cxj instead of 20 been taken as the illustra-
tive number within which the number of heads and tails areto be
equal. Following the method of reasoning there used, wt have
00 heads and c» tails as the result of co throws. Now suppose five
heads thrown. Then 00 — 5 heads and co tails yet remain to be
thrown, and the chance of a head on the sixth throw is expressed
by c» — 5 divided by c» + c» — 5. This ratio is, of course, ex-
actly one half, showing the chance of a head to remain unchanged.
The expression 00 is here used in its ordinary mathematical
sense of — greater than any number which may be assigned. .That
OD is the number of throws that must be made before Bernouilli's
law can be fulfilled will appear on a moment's serious thought.
That is, if the ratio between heads and tails is to certainly vary
from unity by a^'imount less than any assignable quantity, then
the number of throws must be greater than any assignable quan-
tity. Such being the case, any reasoning based on 20 or any other
finite number as the number of throws, must be fallacious and
misleading.
That the results of previous throws cannot possibly have any
bearing on the chances of future throws will appear with aJittle
thought.
In the first place, common sense teaches us that once a throw
executed, it belongs to the past and we pick up the dollar anew to
all intents and purposes as though the preceding throw had never
been made. The chances of any individual throw depend solely
upon the conditions which limit it, and these are wholly contained
in the present. The past has lost all hold on them.
If the past could influence the present or future in such mat-
ters, it would follow that the throwing of our man would influence
that of another. Suppose, for example, two men, each throwing
in succession, and suppose one has thrown six heads ; will the
chances of the other's throwing a head be affected thereby ? As-
suredly not. Suppose the men to be in opposite parts of the earth
and throwing independently of each other. Will the chance of A
in Chicago throwing a head be affected by the fact that just pre-
viously in Calcutta, B has thrown six heads or six tails ? Most
certainly not. If A's chances were thus affected, there would be
no such thing as the calculation of chances or probabilities ; for
pushing the principle to its logical limit, it would follow, in the
case of the coin, that no man in any part of the earth couid throw
a coin and know that he had even chances of head or tail. The
chances would depend not only on all the throws he had ever
made before, but also on all that anybody and everybody have ever
made.
And as with throwing a coin, so with all other events,Involv-
ing chance or probability. If a man were to shake a die/ for in-
stance, the chance of an ace would not be one sixth, but one sixth
plus or minus a certain modification depending on all \he dice-
throwing that has ever been done.
But enough- has been said to show that the principlels falla-
cious. The past, powerful as it is in many ways, cannot effect
questions of chance or probability.
As above stated, fhe general and only safe guide in such mat-
ters is the cardinal principle that the probability of any event is
determined solely and completely by the irrimediate conditions and
limitations of its occurrence.
A failure to understand this principle and a belief that in some
inconceivable way past results do affect present and fului^e prob-
abilities, are not unfrequently met with. They appear in the
schemes of gamblers for so disposing their bets in games of chance
as to surely win—schemes utterly delusive, of course, ks many
know to their cost. We find the same idea also in tbewather
quaint recipe for safety on board ship in time of action ; viz.,
watch where the first shot strikes the ship, and then place your
head immediately behind that spot.
A word or two in closing as to the elements which enter into
the probability of throwing head or tail with a coin.
The assumption that with an indefinitely great number of
throws the ratio between the heads and tails will indefinitely ap-
proach unity, can only be so when either event, //i^m/s or /tn7s, can
happen with equal readiness, and there is no element resembling
a personal equation or bias tending to give one a slight prepond-
erance over the other.
A slight lack of symmetry in the form or homogeneity in the
mass of the coin would be such a disturbing influence, and its
effect would certainly become apparent in a sufficiently great
number of throws. Granting, however, a perfect coin, it seems
at least highly probable that if an individual were to sit down and
make a business of throwing it, that the ratio between heads and
tails would not indefinitely approach unity, but that a tendency
toward a preponderance in either heads or tails would become ap-
parent. The causes of such a tendency would be in the nature of
a personal equation and would result from his almost certainly
falling into something in the nature of a routine of operations,
which routine would affect slightly the results of the throwing.
If we pass from the case of one individual with one coin to
that of many individuals with many coins, it is probable that the
differences from exact fulfillment would be evenly distributed, and
we might in this case perhaps fairly expect a close agreement with
the theory. The effect in any case due to this element of personal
equation is slight, generally inappreciable in the limited range of
ordinary experiment, and from this cause as well as from the fact
that it is almost impossible to submit the matter to anything ap-
proaching careful measurement, its consideration is omitted in the
mathematical discussion of problems relating to choice, chance,
and probability. W. F. Durand.
Agricultural College, Mich.
NOTES.
We have received a number of copies of T/ie lUustyated Med-
ical News (London, 48 Queen Victoria Street), a special magazine
of excellent make-up. Of the articles of interest we may mention
the series by G. W. Hambleton, L.K.Q.C.P., on the "Sup-
pression of Consumption," and a contribution by the same author
on "Physical Development." After an exhaustive review of the
causes of pulmonary disorders and the unnatural conditions of
modern civilization, Mr. Hambleton says : "When we look at the
position such conditions hold in civilization, at the advances that
are being made by man's increasing knowledge of the operations
of nature, and his application of that knowledge to his own pur-
poses, and at the progressive increase of such tendencies, then we
see that in consumption we have one of the processes by which
an adjustment is being made between the body and the work it
has to perform under the changing conditions of advancing civil-
ization, by the removal of those who have a body in excess of that
work, and that the survival of the so-called fittest is thereby
effected." Mr. Hambleton's suggestions regarding the methods by
which consumption may be prevented and the development of the
chest effected, are eminently practical and recommendable. Our
readers will profit much by a perusal of the articles.
Die Eiliische Bedentung der Frauenbewegung (The Ethical Sig-
nificance of the Woman's Rights Movement) formed the subject
of the address of Helene Lange before the General Conference of
the German Woman's Association at Erfurt in September last. It
is eloquently and earnestly written. The sources of Miss Lange's
inspiration are mainly American ; but the Ethics of Hoffding are
often referred to in support of the general theses. (Berlin : L.
Oehmigke.)
